RECENT CASES
Banks and Banking-Drawer Obtaining Certification of Check-Automatic Reduction of Drawer's Account-[Federal].--The reclaimants sought to establish the
existence of a bank balance on a designated day in favor of the bankrupts. On that
day the bankrupts drew a number of checks which were certified by the bank at the
request of the drawer but were not presented by the payee until the next business day.
Held, inter alia, that the certifications did not reduce the bankrupts' account as of the
day of certification. In re Kountze Bros., 4 F. Supp. 679 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1933).
A certification of a check secured by the holder absolutely discharges the drawer
from liability on the instrument. Negotiable Instruments Law § 188; Metropolitan
Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Jones, 137 IIl. 634, 27 N.E. 533 (1891); ContinentalNat. Bank
of Chicago v. Cornhauser,37 Ill. App. 475 (i89o); Times Square Auto Co. v. Rutherford
Nat. Bank, 77 N.J.L. 649, 73 Atl. 479 (19o9); Dunn v. Whalen, 12o App. Div. 729, 105
N.Y.S. 588 (1907); Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (Beutel's 5 th ed. i932),

io6o, § 188. But where the drawer himself secures certification of the check before
delivery, he still remains secondarily liable on the instrument, though the bank becomes primarily liable just as when the holder secures the certification. Borne v. First
National Bank, 123 Ind. 78, 24 N.E. 173 (1889); Minol v. -Russ, i56 Mass. 458, 31
N.E. 489 (1892); Sutter v. Security Trust Co., 95 N.J.Eq. 44, 122 Atl. 381 (1923),
affd. 96 N.J.Eq. 644, 126 Atl. 435 (1924); Lipten v. Columbia Trust Co., 194 App. Div.

384, 185 N.Y.S. 198 (1920). The difference in result is explained on the ground that
when the drawer obtains the certification he merely gets the additional credit of the
bank, whereas when the holder obtain the certification, a new contract is created between the holder and the bank to which the drawer is not a party, since he assumed
that the check would be presented for payment only. 5 Mitchie, Banks and Banking
(perm. ed. 1932), 467, § 256 b.

But even though the drawer remains secondarily liable when he himself secures the
certification, it does not follow that for the same reason his account should not be
automatically reduced immediately upon certification. See Minot v. Russ, 156 Mass.
458, 460, 31 N.E. 489 (1892). It is agreed that certification by the holder causes an
automatic reduction in the drawer's account. Linsky v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 869
(C.C.A. Ist 1925); Times Square Auto Co. v. Rutherford Nat. Bank, 77 N.J.L. 649, 73
Atl. 479 (1909). Where the drawer secures the certification it has been held that his
control over the money set aside to pay the check is terminated. Brown v. Leckie, 43
Ill. 497 (1867); Wright v. AlacCarty, 92 Ill. App. 120 (19o6); see Lipten v. Columbia
Trust Co., 194 App. Div. 384, 185 N.Y.S. 198 (1920).

The fact that the check may never be presented for payment may be considered
similar in nature to a condition subsequent and should not change the original effect
of the certification. See Stevenson v. Earling, 213 Ill. App. 395, affd. 290 Ill. 565, 125
N.E. 322 (1919). And even where the certification is secured by the holder there is also

the possibility that the check will never be presented for payment, in which case
the drawer would be remitted to his former rights against the bank.
In certain other situations certifications secured by the drawer and holder are
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treated similarly: The Statute of Limitations. Girard Bank v. Bank of Penn. Township, 39 Pa. 92 (1861) (by holder); Smith v. Hubbard, 205 Mich. 44, 171 N.W. 546
(1919) (by drawer). Stop payment orders. Sutter v. Security Trust Co., 96 N.J.Eq.
644, 126 At. 435 (1924) (by holder); Carnegie Trust Co. v. FirstNat. Bank, 213 N.Y.
301, 107 N.E. 693 (1915) (by drawer). And at least one court has felt that the situation presented by the principal case does not require different treatment because the
certification was secured by the drawer instead of the holder. Schlesinger v. Kurzrok,
47 Misc. 634, 94 N.Y.S. 442 (,9o5). Cf. McQueen v. Randall, 187 N.E. 286 (Ill. 1933).
See also, Walker v. Sellers, 201 Ala. 189, 77 So. 715 (1918); Stevenson v. Earling, 213
Ill. App. 395, affd. 290 Ill. 565, 125 N.E. 322 (1919); Olsen v. Bankers' Trust Co., 205
App. Div. 66o, 199 N.Y.S. 700 (1923). But see Bathgate v. Exchange Bank, ig Mo.
App. 583, 205 S.W. 875 (1918).
GERALDInE W. LUTES

Constitutional Law-Control of Selection of Presidential Electors by Congress[Federal].-The Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 241
-256 (1926), provides that voluntary political committees must make a public statement of amounts received and expended in influencing the selection of presidential
electors. Defendants were indicted for violation of the act, and demurred on the
ground that the statute contravened U.S. Const., Art. II, § i, providing for state
regulation of the selection of presidential electors. Held, the act was a legitimate exercise of the implied power of Congress to preserve the federal government from the
danger of corruption. Burroughsv. United States, 54 Sup. Ct. 287 (1934).
The power of Congress to regulate federal elections has been upheld on two theories:
First, reliance is placed on the express power to regulate the manner of holding congressional elections granted by U.S. Const. Art. I, § 4. United States v. Gradwell, 243
U.S. 476, 481, 37 Sup. Ct. 407, 61 L. Ed. 857 (1917); cf. Siniley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355,
52 Sup. Ct. 397, 76 L. Ed. 795 (1932). Second, the power to regulate may result as one
"necessary and proper," under U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 18, for executing some other
power vested in Congress by the Constitution. i Willoughby, The Constitutional
Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929), 77-94, §§ 46-59.
Reliance cannot be placed on an express power for the present case, inasmuch as the
power to regulate the manner of appointing presidential electors is specifically vested
in the states by U.S. Const. Art. II, § I, Cl. 2. Cf. In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 1o Sup.
Ct. 586, 33 L. Ed. 951 (18go); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 13 Sup. Ct. 3, 36
L. Ed. 869 (1892). Furthermore a broad construction of the phrase "shall appoint, in
such manner" in Art. II, § I, Cl. 2 would seem to exclude federal regulation. A broad
construction would be consistent with the treatment given the term "manner of holding" an election containedin U.S. Const. Art. I, § 4, Cl. i, which has been interpreted
by the courts to include matters not a part of the actual election. Thus under Art. I,
§ 4, Cl. i, Congress may provide for punishment of election officials for neglect of duty
or for fraud. Ex parte Siebold, 1oo U.S. 371, 25 L. Ed. 717 (1879); Ex parte Clarke, ioO
U.S. 399,25 L. Ed. 715 (1879); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 8 Sup. Ct. 1263, 32 L. Ed. 274
(1888); In re Cohen, 62 F. (2d) 249 (C.C.A. 2d 1932). Corporations may be prohibited
from contributing to campaign funds. United States v. United States Brewers' Assn., 239
Fed. 163 (D.C. Pa. 1916). Candidates may be required to file sworn statements of
campaign expenses. United States v. Cameron, 282 Fed. 684 (D.C. Ariz. 1922). The
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court in the present case, however, construes "shall appoint, in such manner" narrowly
so that it does not negative an implied federal power. The result of this construction,
if not the construction itself, is consistent with the effect of the interpretation given
Art. I, § 4, Cl. i, since both tend to increase congressional power.
Implied powers, inferable from the existence of one or more of the express powers of
Congress, may occasionally be exercised to regulate matters incidental to federal elections. Cf. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 457, 532-533, 2o L. Ed. 287 (1871);
United States v. Gettysburg ElectricRy. Co., 16o U.S. 668, i6 Sup. Ct. 427, 40 L. Ed. 576
(1896). Thus Congress may prohibit interference with the right to vote in federal elections in exercising its power to protect the rights of citizens under the Constitution.
Ex parte Yarbrough, iio U.S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1884); United States
v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386, 35 Sup. Ct. 904, 59 L. Ed. 1355 (1905). Under the power
to obtain information as to authorized legislation, Congress may punish for perjury in
inquiries before it as to campaign expenditures of candidates for election to the Senate.
United States v. Seymour, 5o F. (2d) 930 (D.C. Neb. 1931). Congress may prohibit the
solicitation or receipt of contributions for political purposes between federal officers, in
exercising its power to control such officers. Ex parte Curtis, io6 U.S. 371, i Sup. Ct.
381, 27 L. Ed. 232 (1882); United States v. Thayer, 209 U.S. 39, 42, 28 Sup. Ct. 426, 52
L. Ed. 673 (19o8); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 5o Sup. Ct. 167, 74 L. Ed.
5o8 (1930). Several cases indicate that such implied powers over matters incidental to
federal elections may be derived from the express power to regulate the election itself.
See Ex parte Yarbrough, iio U.S. 65i, 4 Sup. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1884); United
States v. U.S. Brewers' Assn., 239 Fed. 163 (D.C. Pa. 1916).
The existence of an implied power has been denied, however, on the ground that it
is unnecessary inasmuch as the police power of the states may be used to protect the
purity of elections. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 41 Sup. Ct. 469, 65 L. Ed.
913 (1921), criticized in 22 Col. L. Rev. 54 (1922); 19 Mich. L. Rev. 86o (1921). The
weakness of this argument lies in the fact that it ignores the well established principle
that it is not the court's function to consider the actual necessity of the power. McCulloch v. Maryland,4 Wheat. (U.S.) 3 6, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819); Juilliardv. Greenman,
rio U.S. 421, 4 Sup. Ct. 132, 28 L. Ed. 204 (i884 );Fairbanksv. United States, 181 U.S.
283, 21 Sup. Ct. 648, 45 L. Ed. 862 (1901).
The present case in finding an implied power to keep presidential elections free from
corruption would seem to show a definite change in attitude on the part of the court
since the Newberry case.
FRNK~m E. LEE
Constitutional Law-Definition of Phrase "Prima Facie Evidence"-Disorderly
Conduct Statutes-[Michigan].-The defendants were convicted of being disorderly
persons because of having engaged "in an illegal occupation or business." The statute
under which they were convicted made "Proof of recent reputation for engaging in an
.illegal occupation of business .... prima facie evidence of being engaged in an illegal
occupation or business." Michigan Acts (I931), No. 328, § 167. Held, the statute is
unconstitutional as denying "due process of law." People v. Licavoli, 250 N.W. 52o
(Mich. X933), North, Weadock, Sharpe, JJ., dissenting.
The majority of the court defined the statute to mean that evidence of reputation
of being engaged in illegal occupation, unexplained or uncontradicted, would alone be
sufficient to warrant the jury in convicting. The minority, however, took the view that
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the statute merely made such evidence competent and admissible and would require
supporting evidence to warrant the jury in finding guilt.
Statutory presumptions making one fact prima facie evidence of another fact are
upheld although the fact proved is, without more, sufficient to support a finding of
guilt. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 Sup. Ct. 6o0, 40 L. Ed. 793 (1896); People
v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N.E. 865 (I9o8); People v. B. & 0., 246 Ill. 474, 92 N.E.
934 (x~io); Gillespie v. State, 96 Miss. 856, 51 So. 811 (igio); People v. Cannon, 139
N.Y. 33, 34 N.E. 759 (1893). While the jury may be justified in finding a verdict of
guilty from such proof, it may still refuse to do so unless satisfied of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Adams, 22 Id. 485, 126 Pac. 4o (1912); People v. McBride,
234 Ill. 146, 89 N.E. 865 (19o8); People v. Beck, 305 Ill. 593, 137 N.E. 454 (1922);
People v. Cannon, 139 N.Y. 32, 34 N.E., 759 (1893); State v. Momberg, 14 N.D. 291,
io3 N.W. 566 (19o5); Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 Tulane L. Rev. 17,
178, x96 (1930).
Due process of law, however, under state and Federal Constitutions, requires that
there be a natural and rational relation between the fact proved and the fact presumed. Mobile, J. & K. C. R. 1. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 3x Sup. Ct. 136, 55 L. Ed.
78 (19To); Jorrisonv. California,54 Sup. Ct. 281 (1934); Commonwealth v. Williams, 6
Gray (Mass.) 1 (1856); Horne v. Memphis & 0. R. Co., i Coldwell (Tenn.) 72 (i86o);
Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 45 N.E. 991 (r896); State v. Thomnas, 144 Ala. 77,
40 So. 271 (19o6); notes 51 A. L. R. 1139, 86 A. L. R. x79. Both majority and minority
opinions agreed that if the statute was to be interpreted as making proof of reputation
for illegal occupation sufficient, without more, to warrant a finding of such illegal occupation, it would be unconstitutional as depriving the defendant of due process of law.
The decision must therefore be taken as a holding that there is not a sufficient rational
relationship between reputation and conduct to warrant the presumption of the one
from the other. In accord with this view: State v. Beswick, 13 R.I. 211 (iS8i); State
v. Kartz, 13 R.I. 528 (x881); Hughes v. State, 29 Ohio C.C. 237 (1907); Hammond v.
State, 78 Ohio St. 1S, 84 N.E. 416 (igo8); Contra: State v. Thomas, 47 Conn. 546
(r88o); State ex rd. Robertson v. New England Furniture& Carpet Co., 126 Minn. 78,
147 N.W. 951 (1914).
If the statute had created a conclusive, irrebuttable presumption of guilt from proof
of reputation it is conceivable that it might have been upheld on the theory that it was
a change in the substantive criminal law, i.e., that having the reputation was the crime
and not the engaging in illegal business. State v. Thomas, 47 Conn. 546 (r88o); State v.
Buckley, 40 Conn. 246 (1873); contra, State v. Kartz, 13 R.I. 529 (1882). See Brosman,
The Statutory Presumption, 5 Tulane L. Rev. 17, 38-40 (193o); Wigmore, Evidence (2d
ed. 1923), 1059, 1354. That something similar to this may have been intended is suggested by the fact that the business in which the defendants were charged with having
been engaged (extortion, carrying concealed weapons, robbery, murder) involved acts
which of themselves carried much heavier penalties than that imposed by the statute
in question. See Michigan Comp. Laws (1929), §§ 16708, 16722, 16724, 16726, 16754.
The legislation in question is the result of an effort to reach criminals who have been
able to evade punishment because of the archaic technicalities of much of our criminal
procedure, laxness of duty among law enforcing officials and affiliations with political
organizations. See 16 St. Louis L. Rev. 153 (1931). But it seems somewhat extreme
to convict a man for what others say of him. See 30 Mich. L. Rev. 6oo (1932).
HAROLD ALFRED L PTON
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Constitutional Law-Impairment of Contract-Mortgage Moratoria-[Federal].-

Laws of Minnesota (1933), C.339, Part 1,4, authorizes the district court of the county
to extend the period of redemption from mortgage foreclosure for a "just and equitable" period, not beyond May 1, 1935, contingent upon the mortgagor paying the reasonable rental value to be applied to the interest, taxes, and mortgage indebtedness.
The mortgagor is to retain possession during this extended period, but interest continues on the loan, and the act preserves the mortgagee's right to title or deficiency
judgment if the mortgagor fails to redeem. The petitioner, mortgagor, applied to the
court under the provisions of this act, and, over the objections of the mortgagee-purchaser, was granted an extension of the period of redemption until May i, 1935, conditioned on his paying the reasonable rental value. The Supreme Court of Minnesota
denied the mortgagee's contention that this violated the contract clause of the Federal
Constitution. (Art. i, § io). Held, on appeal, the statute as applied does not violate
the contract clause of the Federal Constitution; the emergency existing in Minnesota
furnished a proper occasion for the exercise of the protective power of the state which
is read into all contracts, and the relief afforded is reasonable, protecting the interests
of mortgagees as well as mortgagors. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,
54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934), Sutherland, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler JJ.,
dissenting.
The present case would seem to be an affirmation of two propositions; first, that the
contract clause is limited by the reserved or police power of the state, and second, that
this reserved power must be reasonably exercised. As such, the decision summarizes
and furthers the gradual assimilation of the contract clause to the fourteenth amendment. See Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudications-A Study of Modified
and Overruled Decisions, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 375 (1933). This gradual assimilation
has been furthered by the upholding of some legislation operating on the enforcement
of a contract claim as affecting the remedy and not the right. Sturges v. Crowninshield,
4 Wheat (U.S.) 122, 200, 4 L. Ed. 529 (r819);Jacksonv. Lamphire,3 Peters (U.S.) 280,
287, 7 L. Ed. 679 (1830); Waggoner v. Flack, 188 U.S. 595, 23 Sup. Ct. 345, 47 L. Ed.
609 (1903); Funkhouserv. Preston, 54 Sup. Ct. 134, 78 L. Ed. 125 (1933); cf. Curtis v.
Whitney, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 68, 71, 2o L. Ed. 513 (1871); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S.
595, 600, 24 L. Ed. 793 (1877); Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U.S. 105, 38 Sup. Ct. 44,
62 L. Ed. 178 (1917); James v. Stull, 9 Barb. (N.Y.) 482 (185o); March v. State, 44
Tex. 64 (1875). And by the recognition that contracts concerned with matters inherently affected with a public interest may be abrogated by legislation for the public
welfare. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 24 L. Ed. 1O36 (1879) (nuisance);
Stone v. 31ississippi, IOI U.S. 814, 25 L. Ed. 1079 (188o) (lotteries); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623,8 Sup. Ct. 273,31 L. Ed. 205 (1887) (liquor control). Later cases expanded the concept of "affected with a public interest" to include matters temporarily so
affected. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865 (1921); Marcus
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170,41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65 L. Ed. 877 (1921); Levy
Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289, 66 L. Ed. 595 (1922); Wickersham,
The Police Power and the New York Emergency Rent Laws, 69 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 301
(1921). Whether these contracts be deemed to have been "frustrated" or "appropriated," to use the language of the dissenting opinion in the principal case, 54 Sup. Ct.
231, 253-54, they were subject to a police power reasonably used for a legitimate end.
See 47 Harv. L. Rev. 663 (1034).
Debtor relief legislation, however, might well have been excluded from this dis-
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pensation given other statutes inasmuch as the historic purpose of the contract clause
was to prohibit "laws delaying the collection of matured debts," i Beard, The Rise of
American Civilization (1927), 328; Edwardsv. Kear-ey, 96 U.S. 595, 604-607, 2 4 L. Ed.
793 (1877). Thus various forms of stay laws enacted during recurring depressions have
been held unconstitutional as impairing existing contracts. McCracken v. Hayward,
2 How. (U.S.) 6o8, ii L. Ed. 397 (1844) (prohibiting a foreclosure sale for less than
two thirds the appraised value of the property); Bronson v. Kinzie, i How. (U.S.) 311,
ii L. Ed. 143 (1843) (unconditionally extending the period of redemption for one year
without provision for payment of rental value); State v. Klein, 249 N.W. 118 (N.D.
1933) (extending all periods of redemption for a year with no compensation provided);
see Bunn, The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria, i Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 249 (1933); Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46
Harv. L. Rev. io6i, io8i (1933). The present case now places this class of legislation
under the protection and the restrictions of the police power. See Corwin, Moratorium
over Minnesota, 82 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 311, 312 (1934).
The dissent of the minority in the present case, however, would indicate their belief that the use of the reserved power'of the state is based on the doctrine of implied
conditions, contingent upon an interpretation of the possible intent of the parties.
Thus they conclude that although there may be an implied condition that a business
affected with a public interest may be prohibited, it "would be more than unreasonable, it would be absurd" to imply a condition that performance of the obligation in
the same business may be modified since it must be assumed "that the contract was
made on the footing that so long as the obligation remained lawful, the impairment
clause would effectively preclude a law altering or nullifying it however exigent the
occasion might be." 54 Sup. Ct. 231, 254.
Undoubtedly there is some similarity between the police power and the doctrine of
implied conditions. It has been suggested that the real basis for the police power is
justice between the parties, Abbot, Police Power and Right to Compensation, 3 Harv.
L. Rev. 189, igg (i8go), and the actual basis for implied conditions is said to be fairness between the parties, 2 Williston, The Law of Contracts (1920), 1577, § 825. An
implied condition, however, may be negatived by the expressed intention of the parties. 2 Williston, The Law of Contracts (1920), 1575-1576, § 824. There is no such
limitation upon the police power. See Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557,
562, 19 Sup. Ct. 281, 43 L. Ed. 552 (1899). Thus in the present case, if the mortgage
had contained an express declaration that the obligation should not be modified during
any emergency, an implied condition would have been impossible, yet the court undoubtedly would have held the contract subject to the reserved power. of the state.
And while the parties might be considered to be contracting away future rights which
might be given to them by any stay law, such provisions undoubtedly would be disregarded as are similar attempts to evade the bankruptcy laws. Nelson v. Stewart, 54
Ala. 15, 25 Am. Rep. 66o (1875); FederalNational Bank. v. Koppel, 253 Mass. 157,
148 N.E. 379 (1925); 40 A.L.R. 1443 (1925).
It is clear, however, that legislation which alters existing contracts must be reasonable if it is to be upheld. Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 774, 775, 2 Sup. Ct. 91
27 L. Ed. 468 (1882). In the present case, the emergency and the protection afforded
the mortgagee's interest seem to have been indispensable to a finding of reasonableness. Whether there is any difference, which may be doubted, between an emergency
creating a power and the emergency furnishing the occasion for the exercise of the pow-
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er (54 Sup. Ct. 231, 235), the emergency is an operative fact without which the statute
would not have been upheld. The payment of a fair rental value, the limitation of the
extension to a definite and comparatively short time, the continuation of interest, and
the preservation of the right to a deficiency judgment are all factors protecting the interest of the mortgagee, and the absence of any one of them might have led the court
to declare the statute unreasonable. Thus the fate of less conservative moratoria legislation is doubtful. Cf. Alliance Trust Co. v. Hall, 5 F. Supp. 285 (D.C. Ida. 1933).
Moreover, should certain moratoria legislation be held unconstitutional as to certain
types of property only, as has been suggested, the question of equal protection of the
laws may arise. Cf. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254

(1921); see Bunn, The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria,
i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 249, 260, 261 (I934); 17 Harv. L. Rev. 66o, 666 (1924).
If the fate of future legislation modifying existing contracts is to be dependent upon
what the courts will call "reasonable," it is important to know whether the courts will
follow the usual rule in determining the constitutionality of a statute and presume
reasonableness in the absence of a showing of unreasonableness. 2 Willoughby, The
Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929), 42. While there is some lan-

guage in the present case which might indicate that reasonableness will be presumed
("Whether the legislation is wise or unwise as a matter of policy is a question with
which we are not concerned." 54 Sup. Ct. 231, 243), the mere declaration by the legislature that an emergency exists will not suffice. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S.
543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405, 68 L. Ed. 841 (1924); but see Wigmore, A Constitutional Way to

Reach the Housing Profiteer, 15 Ill. L. Rev. 359, 365 (1921). The courts may follow
the somewhat analogous treatment of the guarantee of freedom of speech and of press,
and perhaps require a greater showing of constitutionality than is usually the case.
See PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v. .Malon,260 U.S. 393,43 Sup. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922);

Bunn, The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria, i Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 249, 251 (1934); but see Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 775, 2 Sup. Ct.
91, 27 L. Ed. 468 (1882); as to freedom of speech and of press, see Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919); Gitlow v. State of New York,
268 U.S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925); Stromberg, v. State of California,
283 U.S. 359, 5i Sup. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 11r7 (93i); Near v. State of Minn. ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 73 L. Ed. 1357 (1930; Walsh, Freedom of Speech
and Press, 21 Geo. L. Jour. i6i, 188 (1033); 14 111. L. Rev. 6o (1920).

In its use of reasonableness as the test, the court avoided saying that the legislation
involved merely the remedy and not the right. As enunciated by Marshall, the doctrine that legislation impairing the remedy and not the right was not an impairment of
contract seems to have been a short hand way of declaring reasonableness. Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 122, 200, 4 L. Ed. 529 (I819). Since then, the distinc-

tion has been applied somewhat automatically. See Von Homffan v. City of Quincy,
4 Wall. (U.S.) 535, 554, 18 L. Ed. 403 (1866); 31 Harv. L. Rev. 49T (1918). The court

approached the terminology of the remedy-right doctrine, when it pointed out that
courts of equity have fixed the time and terms of sale of mortgaged property and have
refused upon equitable grounds to confirm sales, and that the statute in question provides a cognate procedure and relief. See Suring State Bank v. Giese, 246 N.W. 556, 85
A.L.R. x477 (Wis. 1933); 8 Minn. L. Rev. 318, 327 (1934); 42 Yale L. Jour. 961 (933).
When applying the remedy-right doctrine courts have reasoned from the practice of a
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court to the ability of the legislature. This was recently done by the Supreme Court in
Funkhouser v. Preston, 54 Sup. Ct. 134, 78 L. Ed. 125 (1933). But an erroneous decision
of a court ig not an impairment of contract, nor, it would seem, a denial of due process.
Central Land Co. v. Laidley 159 U.S. 103, 112, 16 Sup. Ct. 8o, 40 L. Ed. 91 (1895);
Bonner v. Gorman, 213 U.S. 86, 29 Sup. Ct. 483, 53 L. Ed. 709 (19o8); Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29,44 Sup. Ct. 246, 68 L. Ed. 547 (1924); Black, American Constitutional
Law (4th ed. 1927) 628, 71o; but see 28 Ill. L. Rev. 832 (1934). And what is permitted

the court is not necessarily permitted the legislature.
The Supreme Court disregarded the suggestion of the Minnesota Court that the
act in question could possibly be maintained as an exercise of the power of eminent domain. Blaisdell v. Home Building & Loan Association, 249 N.W. 334, 338 (Minn.
1933); see Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 692, 17 Sup. Ct.
718, 41 L. Ed. 1165 (1897). The lack of condemnation proceedings or of action taken

under an eminent domain statute would not change the essential character of the eminent domain power. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 54 Sup. Ct. 26, 78 L. Ed. 37
(1933). A private individual acting for his own benefit may be given the power to exercise eminent domain for the state. i Lewis, Eminent Domain ( 3 d ed.

19o9),

15,500,

§§ 6,253. Because of the emergency, it would be a public use that mortgagors be left in
possession and be given additional rights to regain title. See Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S.
361, 25 Sup. Ct. 676,49 L. Ed. 1o85 (1905); Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200
U.S. 527, 26 Sup. Ct. 301, 50 L. Ed. 58i (19o6); cf. New State Ice Co. v. Lielnnan, 285
U.S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L. Ed. 747 (193i); Connecticut College for Women v.

Calvert, 87 Conn. 421, 88 Ati. 633 (I913); Palairet'sAppeal, 67 Pa. 479, 5 Am. Rep.
450 (1871); 15 Harv. L. Rev. 900 (1902); 23 Yale L. Jour. 274 (1914). It would seem
doubtful, however, whether the fair rental value, while a factor makingfor reasonableness under the police power, is fair compensation under eminent domain. Cf. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct. 622, 37 L. Ed. 463
(1893); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 43 Sup. Ct. 354,
67 L. Ed. 664 (1923); Olson v. United States, 67 F. (2d) 24 (C.C.A. 8th 1933). While

the inability of the mortgagee to take possession may not be so important inasmuch as
the land is desired as security in most cases (The Supreme Court pointed out that most
of the mortgagees were corporations. 54 Sup. Ct. 231, 243), the mortgagee is still denied clear title, and the right to make improvements at depression prices. Admitting
that the right of immediate sale in a depressed market might not be of much value, the
extension of the period of redemption leaves the mortgagee in the position of knowing
that if economic conditions improve he will probably never get the land, but if values
decrease, he will get the land when it is worth least.
The significance of the present case is perhaps to be found in the declaration by the
Chief Justice that "there has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the
necessity of finding rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare."
54 Sup. Ct. 231, 241. This growing appreciation of public needs was expressed in somewhat similar language by Justice Cardozo in Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process
(1921), 82. To find this rational compromise will involve not only legal reason and
acumen, but "the highest attributes of statesmanship." Brown and Hall, The Police
Power and Economic Reconstruction, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 224, 248 (1933); Gray, The
Nature and Sources of the Law (1909), 215.
ROBERT B. Smkpmo

RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process-Notice and Hearing--[Federal].A Virginia statute (Virginia Michie's Code (1930 § 3974a) empowered the State Highway Commissioner to order the elimination of a grade crossing and construction of an
overhead passage whenever he found it necessary for the public safety or convenience,
with the cost of construction divided between the state and railroad. The Virginia court
construed the act as providing for no notice and hearing, nor for any complete review
by any court of the commissioner's action, but denied the defendant railroad's contention that an order under the act violated due process. Held, on appeal, Hughes,
C. 3., Stone and Cardozo, JJ. dissenting, the act as construed violates the fourteenth
amendment of the Federal Constitution in depriving the defendant of procedural due
process. Southern Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 54 Sup. Ct. 148, 78 L. Ed. 186
(1933).
The general rule is that procedural due process requires an administrative board or
official to give notice and an opportunity for a hearing to one whose property interest
will be endangered by the administrative order. ChicagoMilwaukee & St. PaulRy.Co.
v. Mfinnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 1o Sup. Ct. 462, 33 L. Ed. 955 (1890); 3 Willoughby, The
Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929), 1732; 8o'Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 96
(1931); see Powell, Administrative Exercise of the Police Power, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 333
(1911). The requirement of notice and hearing is satisfied, however, if the interested
party has an opportunity for a complete hearing anywhere along the line before final
judgment. Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U.S. 399,415, 22 Sup. Ct. 384,46 L. Ed. 612 (1902);
Vandalia Railroad Co.v. Public Service Commission of Indiana, 242 U.S. 255, 37 Sup.
Ct. 93, 6i L. Ed. 276 (1916); see for cases upholding the application of a statute similar
to the present save that complete judicial review was provided: Erie R.R. Co. v.
Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 254 U.S. 394, 41 Sup. Ct. 169, 65 L. Ed. 322
(1921); Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 278 U.S. 24,
49 Sup. Ct. 69, 73 L. Ed. 161 (1928). In the case of a nuisance or of immediate public
danger, summary abatement under administrative order is allowed, but it would seem
a later hearing in a court having competent jurisdiction to review in toto the order of
the administrative body or to retry the facts upon which the order was based is necessary. Lawlon v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385 (1894); North
American Coal Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 29 Sup. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed.
195 (1908). If procedural due process is not otherwise satisfied, a court hearing limited
to the question of whether the order is so erroneous as to be arbitrary and lacking in
substantive due process will not suffice. Cf. Hagar v. Reclamation District No. xo8,
ii U.S. 70l,4 Sup. Ct. 663, 28L. Ed. 569 (1884). In the present case, since the act as
construed allowed no notice and hearing, or complete review by any court, according
to the general rule, procedural due process was violated.
An exception to the general rule is made, however, when the administrative proceedings are said to be "legislative" in character, as opposed to quasi judicial. If
the administrative proceeding is what the courts will deem "legislative," no notice and
hearing is necessary, although an unreasonable or arbitrary order may always be attacked for lack of substantive due process. North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of
Chicago, 211 U.S. 3o6, 29 Sup. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed. 195 (1908); Atlantic Coast Line R. R.
Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 364, 58 L. Ed. 721 (1914). This distinction between "legislative" and quasi judicial proceedings is not at all clear so far as
notice and hearing are concerned, inasmuch as in some cases notice and hearing will be
required for what is denoted a legislative proceeding. See Dickinson, Administrative
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Justice and the Supremacy of Law (1927), io6, note 3, io8, citing Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct. 462, 33 L. Ed. 970 (i89o);
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville 6 Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33
Sup. Ct. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431 (I9M3). And while a general definition of "legislation" may
be given, its application is difficult. See Prentisv. Atlantic CoastLine Co., 211 U.S. 210,
226, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. i5o (19o8).
It has been held that "the legislative power of a state may control the question of
grades and crossings of its streets," and that a city ordinance requiring a railroad to
construct and maintain a viaduct is valid without notice and hearing. Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R. v. Nebraska, 17o U.S. 57, 75, i8 Sup. Ct. 513, 42 L. Ed. 848 (1898). If a municipal
corporation acting under authority delegated by the state legislature need give no
notice and hearing while ordering the construction of a viaduct, it might be argued that
the State Highway Commissioner should be likewise privileged when acting under
power given him by the state legislature, and when giving the same order. This may
have been the reasoning of the dissenting justices in the present case who seemed to
rely entirely on the above decision. In passing an ordinance the municipality is usually
said to be exercising a "legislative" and not a quasi judicial function. See New Orleans
Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U.S. iS, 31, 8 Sup. Ct. 741, 31
L. Ed. 607 (x888); North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 3o6,
313,
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Sup. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed. 195 (i9o8); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. City of

Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 555, 34 Sup. Ct. 364, 366 (I914); cf. Health Departmentof City
of New York v. Rector, r45 N.Y. 32, 39 N.E. 833 (1895). To exempt similarly the proceedings of the State Highway Commissioner would be to place them in the "legislative" category. The majority opinion in its refusal to do this would seem to indicate
a desire to restrict this use of the word "legislative" as a device for avoiding notice and
hearing.

MISHA RuBIN

Contracts-Impossibility-Frustration-[Ontario].-The defendant corporation
contracted to withdraw from a manufacturers' association and to employ plaintiffs
for one year if plaintiffs would withdraw from their labor union. Immediately upon
the beginning of performance of the contract, the union called a strike in which several
of the contracting employees were intimidated or assaulted. The police failed to give
adequate protection. Plaintiffs worked for a period of time at the end of which the
defendant entered into an agreement with the union and dismissed the plaintiffs because
they were not reinstated by the union. Held, that the defendant was not liable for failing to employ the plaintiffs for one year, there being an implied condition in the agreement that if the existence of an independent shop became impossible, performance
would be excused. Ziger v. Shigfer & Hillman Co., [1933] 2 D.L.R. 691.
Under early common law it was generally stated that a promisor was not excused
from his promise unless he had expressly provided for the contingency rendering performance impossible. Paradinev. Jane,Aleyn 26 (K.B. 1647). Three definite exceptions were soon grafted upon this general rule. i. A change in domestic law will excuse
performance. United States v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 671 (C.C.D.Neb. 19o4); Baily v. De
Crespigny, 4 Q.B. i8o (1869). 2. The death or illness of a party who has contracted to
render personal service will excuse performance. Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N.Y. 4o (1877);
Poussardv. Spiers & Pond, i Q.B.D. 410 (1876). 3. The desttuction of the subject
matter, without fault of either party, will excuse performance. Stewart v. Stone, 127
N.Y. 500, 28 N.E. 595 (189i); Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B-.& S. 826 (Q.B. 1863).
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In a few cases the destruction of the expected value of the contract was held to
excuse performance. Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740; Alfred Marks Realty Co. v.
Hotel Hermitage, 17o App. Div. 484, ir6 N.Y.S. 179 (1915). A still further category of
cases, and the one into which the present case must fall, to be sustained, excuses performance where there is a destruction of the means of performance. EarnLine S.S.Co.
v. Sutherland S.S.Co., 254 Fed. 126 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. i918), affd. 264 Fed. 276 (C.C.A.
2d 1920); Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, i56 Pac. 458 (916); Kinzer
Construction Co. v. State, 125 N.Y.S. 46 (Ct.Cl. i9io); Horlock v. Beal, [1r16] 1 A.C.
486. See 3 Williston, Contracts (1920), 3288, § 1935.
If the absence of interference by the union be considered the "means" to performance of the contract, the strike called by the union could be considered a destruction
of such means. But a strike, even though unexpected, does not excuse performance in
other types of contracts. Barry v. United States, 229 U.S. 47, 33 Sup. Ct. 68,, 57 L.
Ed. io6o (x913); Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Seaboard TransportationCo., 154
Fed. go (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907), reversed on other grounds, 161 Fed. 99 (C.C.A. 2d
i9o8); but see Geismer v. L.S.& M.S.Ry. Co., 102 N.Y. 563, 7 N.E. 828 (1886). The
strike in the present case must have been not only expected but almost uppermost in
the contemplation of the parties; it was an inevitable result of performance of the
contract. Yet the defendant was excused from performance because of the existence
of the very thing for which in effect it had contracted. The severity of the strike
may have greatly increased the difficulty of performance but such could hardly have
been considered an "unanticipated circumstance" that would excuse performance.
3 Williston, Contracts (1920), 3337, § 1963. But see 47 Harv. L. Rev. 702 (1934).
GEORGE -EMBOLSHEMIER

Corporations-Pre-emptive Rights-Treasury Stock-[New York].-Plaintiff was a
shareholder in the American Metal Co. which held 1,685 of its shares as "treasury
stock." Defendants, directors in the company, without offering to the other shareholders an opportunity to subscribe for a pro ratashare of the treasury stock, turned
o
it all over to themselves at a price of $7 a share, thus obtaining control of the company. The company was thereafter sold to another corporation for a sum equivalent
to about $661 for each share. Plaintiff then sued for damages resulting from defendants' refusal to allow him to subscribe for a pro rata share of the treasury stock.
Held, the plaintiff had a "pre-emptive right" to at least an offer of the stock before the
directors sold it to themselves. Hammer v. IVerner, 239 App. Div. 38, 265 N.Y.S. 172
(1933).
It is well settled that a stockholder, in order to protect his proportionate interest
in the management and assets (which might include a surplus) of the corporation, has
the pre-emptive right to be offered a ratable amount of additional shares in the corporation when issued by the directors. Kingston v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, ii
Del. Ch. 258, ioi Ati. 898 (1917); Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., i86 N.Y. 285, 78
N.E. togo (i9o6); Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation (ist ed. 1932) 144;
Morawetz, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 186 (1928);
Drinker, The Pre-emptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares, 43
Harv. L. Rev 586 (i93o).
As an exception to this rule, it is generally stated that stockholders have no preemptive right to subscribe to a pro rata share of an issue of treasury stock, i.e., those
shares which have been issued and repurchased by the corporation. Borg v. Interna-
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tional Silver Co., ii F. (2d) 147 (C.C.A. 2d 1925); Crosby v. Stratton, 17 Colo. App. 212,
68 Pac. 13o (19o2); Hartridge v. Rockwell, R. M. Charlton 260 (Ga. 1828); State v.
Smith, 48 Vt. 266 (1876); 52 A.L.R. 236; Berle and Means, The Modem Corporation
(ist ed. 1932) 257; Cook on Corporations (7 th ed. 1913), § 286; Fletcher, Cyc. Corp.
(rev. ed. 1932), § 516o; Drinker, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to
New Shares, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 586, 603 (1930); Morawetz, The Preemptive Right of
Shareholders, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 186, 197 (1928). The reason for this denial of the preemptive right to treasury stock is usually based on the ground that the shareholder's
proportionate interest is determined by the original authorized issue, and is not, therefore, affected by reissue. 36 Yale L. ]our. 1i8i (1927). Cf. Berle and Means, The
Modern Corporation (xst ed. 1932), 257; Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (rev. ed. 1932), § 5136,
where it is suggested that all exceptions to the pre-emptive rule are arbitrary, necessitated by the courts' desire to break down a rule they have found too inflexible for
modern corporate needs.
A modification of the exception is made by the Restatement on Law of Business Associations (Tentative Draft No. I, 1928), allowing a pre-emptive right to attach in
certain circumstances to the sale of treasury stock: "If .... the acquisition of the
shares by the corporation is for the purpose of reducing the number of voting shares,
then after the reduction takes place, the creation of new voting shares, like any other
proposed increase in the number of voting shares, gives to existing voting shareholders
pre-emptive rights as to the proposed new shares." § 17, comment (a).
But the cases cited by the Restatement and much of the language of the principal
case indicate how vague may become the boundary line between the pre-emptive
right and the director's fiduciary obligation. It is unfortunate from the Restatement's
point of view that the cases cited by it involve a breach of director's fiduciary obligation, Commentaries- on Business Associations (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1928), § 17;
since irrespective of the presence or absence of any rule giving pre-emptive rights to
shareholders, it is a breach of duty on the part of directors, for which the courts will
give relief, to sell treasury shares or to issue authorized but unissued shares for the purpose of giving themselves or their friends an advantage at expense of the other stockholders. Arkansas Valley Agricultural Society v. Eichholtz, 45 Kans. 164, 25 Pac. 613
(i891); Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 8o N.E. 450; 52 A.L.R. 237 (1907); Fosgate v.
Boston Market Terminal Co., 75 Mass. 99, 175 N.E. 86 (931); Whitaker v. Kilby, 55
Misc. 337, io6 N.Y.S. 511 (1907), affd. io6 N.Y.S. 1149; Provident Trust Co. v. Geyer,
248 Pa. 423, 94 Atl. 77 (1915); Glenn v. KittanningBrewing Co., 259 Pa. 5Io, 1o3 At.
340 (1918); Luther v. Luther, 118 Wis. 112, 94 N.W. 69 (19o3); Dunn v. Acmne Auto and
Garage Co., 168 Wis. 128, 169 N.W. 297 (1918); Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (Rev. ed. 1932)
§ 516o- notes 87-90; Morawetz, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders, 42 Harv. L.
Rev. i86 (1928); Drinker, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New
Shares, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 586 (1930). See also Borg v. InternationalSilver Co., ir F.
(2d) 147 (C.C.A. 2d 1925); Federal Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 132 Kans. 129,
294 Pac. 859 (1931); Petre v. Bruce, 157 Tenn. 131, 7 S.W. (2d) 43 (1928). Cf. Frey,
Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights, 38 Yale L. jour. 563 (1929); note, 36 Yale L. Jour.
1181 (1927). The decision of the instant case allows to the individual shareholders
relief for such breach of fiduciary obligation by raising a pre-emptive right to subscribe. Cf. Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage R. Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 17o N.E. 917 (1930),
where it is said that directors cannot issue to themselves authorized but unissued stock
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for the purpose of obtaining control of the company without first offering it to all the
shareholders.
In support of this decision it may be said that to the average shareholder the preemptive right is the only sure protection against dilution of his interest, even though
the courts would probably protect him where such right does not exist if he could show
breach of duty by directors. But it is often difficult to prove that directors were acting
fraudulently, in violation of their fiduciary obligations, when they issued corporate
stock to strangers, and it is too expensive a procedure for the small stockholder to
bring a suit without certainty of recovery. Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights,
38 Yale L. Jour. 563 (1929).
On the other hand, in favor of limiting the pre-emptive right wherever possible,
there is the suggestion that under our modern complex corporate systems with many
different classifications of stock the pre-emptive right raises too many insoluble problems and hinders the directors in efficient corporate financing. Berle and Means, The
Modem Corporation (ist ed. 1032), 176-178; Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (rev. ed. 1932),
§ 5136; Drinker, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 586 (1930).

But in any event, where the stockholder has been deprived of the pre-emptive right
safeguard against dilution through exception, qualification, or waiver, the courts
should, as in the principal case, require a high degree of duty on the part of directors,
and should be on the alert to prevent fraudulent and inequitable dilution of the stockholder's interest.
NATHAN WOLFBERG

County Boards-Jurisdiction-Collateral Attack Based on Facts outside the
Record-[Nebraskal.-Compiled Statutes of Nebraska 1929, C. 2, Art. ii, prescribed
that if a remonstrance petition be filed with the county board against the allowance of
a budget for the county farm bureau, the county board shall place the proposition on
the ballot at the next election. After an enumeration of the qualifications for, and
number of the remonstrators necessary, the statute provided that "in considering the
sufficiency of the remonstrance, the county board shall ignore the names of remonstrators who had previously signed a petition for the organization of the farm bureau."
The Fillmore county board determined, upon hearing, that such a petition complied with the statute and ordered the county clerk to place the proposition on the
ballot. Plaintiffs, taxpayers of the county, seeking to enjoin the clerk, alleged that
many of the remonstrators were in fact disqualified, despite the finding of the county
board. On demurrer the lower court granted the injunction. Held, that the decree be
reversed and the bill dismissed; the county board acted quasi-judicially in determining
the sufficiency of the petition and its judgment could not be attacked collaterally but
only in a direct proceeding which was available to the plaintiffs. Everts v. Young, 251
N.W.

1O9

(Neb. 1933).

County boards, boards of county commissioners or supervisors, and like inferior
tribunals, being creatures of statute, must affirmatively show on the record of their
proceedings a compliance with the statutory prerequisites known as jurisdictional
facts; otherwise their orders or decisions may be collaterally attacked. Larimer v.
Krau, 57 Ind. App. 33, io5 N.E. 936 (1914); Hinton v. Perry County, 84 Miss. 536, 36
So. 565 (1904); Adams v. First NationalBank of Greenwood, 103 Miss. 744, 6o So. 770
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(1913); Doody v. Vaughn, 7 Neb. 28 (1879); Letherman v. Hauser, 77 Neb. 731, 110
N.W. 745 (19o6). These jurisdictional facts may be classed as (i) quasi-jurisdictional,
those which only need be established to the satisfaction of the statutory tribunal, and
(2) strictly jurisdictional, those which must be actually present to give validity to the
order or decision. Quasi-jurisdictional facts, when shown on the record to be established to the satisfaction of the statutory tribunal, cannot be made the basis for a collateral attack on the tribunal's order or decision. Noble v. Union River Logging Ry.,
147 U.S. 165, 13 Sup. Ct. 271, 37 L. Ed. 123 (1893). But with strictly jurisdictional

facts, even though the record affirmatively states their existence, a collateral attack
will be allowed by showing their absence. McCarterv. Sooy Oyster Co., 78 N.J.L. 394,
75 At. 211 (IgIo).

Since the authorizing statute may require the existence of either type of fact, strictly jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional, it becomes necessary to determine from the
language of the statute which is required in any particular case. In such a determination the attitude of the court will play a large part, for a specific requirement of either
type of fact is seldom made by the words of the statute. Thus it was held in State v.
McClymon, 7 Oh. Dec. Rep. iog, i Wdy. Cinnc. L. Bull. 116 (1876), that a specified
number of signatures to a petition was a fact of strict jurisdiction, while in Ward v.
Board of Commissioners, 199 Ind. 467, 157 N.E. 721 (1927), the court decided that the

same fact was quasi-jurisdictional.
One line of authority assumes that the statutory requirements are strictly jurisdictional unless the contrary is specified. Chase v. Trout, 146 Cal. 350, 8o Pac. 8i (19o5);

Wilcox v. Engebretsen, 16o Cal. 288, 116 Pac. 750 (1911); Miller v. Amsterdam, 149
N.Y. 288, 43 N.E. 632 (1896); State v. McClymon, 7 Oh. Dec. Rep. 1O9, i Widy. Cinnc.
L. Bull. 116 (1876). Such an approach seems to impair the efficacy and value of these
statutory tribunals. Preferable is the opposing line of authority, represented by the
principal case, which regards the requirements of the statute, unless prevented by a
clear expression in the statute, as quasi-jurisdictional. Hull v. Board of Commissioners,
195 Ind. 150, 143 N.E. 589 (1924); Ward v. Board of Commissioners, igg Ind. 467, 157
N.E. 721 (1927); Reich v. Cochran, 1o5 App. Div. 542, 94 N.Y.S. 404 (1905); County of
Lewis v. Montfort, 72 Wash. 248, 130 Pac. 115 (1913). This latter view of course would

still recognize as strictly jurisdictional, matters the lack of which would subject even
the decisions of courts of general jurisdiction to collateral attack, such as the facts
necessary for jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter.
In the present case, the court was aided in reaching its decision by the phrase in the
authorizing statute, "in considering the sufficiency of the petition," which suggests
that the finding of the county board was to have some finality, the inference from that
being that the requirements were quasi-jurisdictional. Since a statutory appeal was
available, in which the absence of both type of jurisdictional facts might be shown, the
plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the court's holding. Larimerv. Krau, 57 Ind. App. 33,
105 N.E. 936 (1914); Hinton v. Perry County, 84 Miss. 536, 36 So. 565 (19o4); Taylor v.
Davey, 55 Neb. 153, 75 N.W. 553 (1898); Campbell Co. v. Boyd County, 117 Neb. 186,
22o N.W. 240 (1928); Abraham v. Homer, 102 Okla. 12, 226 Pac. 45 (1924). Where

such statutory appeal is not provided for, injunctional relief might well be allowed.
Ackerman v. Thummel, 40 Neb. 95, 58 N.W. 738 (1894).
WALTER W. BAKER
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Equity-Doctrine of Clean Hands as Applied to Separate Causes of Action-[Federal].-In a suit for infringement of five patents, the first a basic one and the others for
improvements, plaintiff's lack of clean hands was set up as a defense. Before plaintiff
had conceived of the device embodied in the first improvement, a supposed prior use
thereof had been made. Several years later plaintiff learned of this fact, and secured
from the prior user an assignment of all his rights and an agreement to suppress evidence as to the use. Subsequently, in a suit against one Byers, plaintiff obtained a decree of validity and infringement of three patents, including the one supposedly invalidated by the prior use. Immediately thereafter he instituted the present suit, alleging
infringement by the defendants of the same patents as were involved in the prior action, and sought a temporary injunction, partly on the basis of the prior decree. The
injunction was refused. Plaintiff later amended his complaint to include claims of infringement of the remaining two patents, and continued to trial. Held, the transaction
with the prior user, and the employment of the prior decree (secured in part by suppressing evidence) in applying for a temporary injunction, were so unconscionable as
to bar plaintiff from relief, in this suit, as to any patent. Keystone Driller Co. v.
General Excavator Co., 54 Sup. Ct. 146 (1933).
The maxim that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands arose in
early times when exercise of the powers of a court of equity was largely a matter of discretion. i Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4 th ed. 1918), 739, § 398. Generally the
maxim will be applied only in favor of a person substantially injured by the acts of
which he complains. Meyer v. Yesser, 32 Ind. 294 (1869); Halladay v. Faurot, 8 Ohio
Dec. Rep. 633 (1883); Langdon v. Templeton, 66 Vt. 173, 28 Atl. 866 (1893); Langley
v. Devlin, 95 Wash. 171, 163 Pac. 395 (1917). The maxim has not been applied where
the harm to the defendant is small, and the injury to the plaintiff through denying relief would be great. Valley Smokeless Coal Co. v. Manufacturers' Water Co., 302 Pa.
Atl. 327 (1930); McNair v. Benson, 63 Ore. 66, 126 Pac. 20 (1912); Bias v.
Bias, 155 S.E. 898 (W.Va. 193o); Huntzicker v. Crocker, 135 Wisc. 38, 115 N.W. 340
232, 153

(i9o8).
Several exceptions to this general rule have evolved. It has been suggested that
where plaintiff has a fraudulent intent and commits an overt act in attempting to
effectuate that intent, he comes within the maxim irrespective of injury to the defendant. See Curtinv. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 85, 32 Sup. Ct. 31, 56 L. Ed. 102 (1911);
Peltzer v. Gilbert, 26o Mo. 500, 521-522, 169 S.W. 257 (194); Cook v. Chapman, 30
N.J. Eq. 114, 118 (1878).
It has also been held sufficient for the maxim to be applied to show that plaintiff's
acts constituted a fraud on the public, or were criminally punishable. Worden & Co.
v. California Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516, 23 Sup. Ct. *6i, 47 L. Ed. 282 (i9o3); American
University v. Wood, 294 Ill. i86, 128 N.E. 330 (1920); Munn & Co. v. American Co.,
83 N.J. Eq. 309, 41 Atl. 87 (i914);

but cf. General Electric Co. v. Minn. Electric Lamp

Co., io F. (2d) 85i (D. C. Minn. i924); Carson Inv. Co. v. Anaconda Copper Co., 26
F. (2d) 65i (C.C.A. 9 th 1928); i Walker, Patents (6th ed. 1929), 720, § 625.
It is not sufficient, however, to show that plaintiff has committed a reprehensible,
fraudulent or criminal act; that act must be closely related to the subject matter of
the suit in which the defense is set up. i Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4 th ed.
i9r8), 741, § 399. Thus, inequitable conduct with respect to one claim or "cause of
action" has been held not to bar other claims or "causes of action" in the same suit.
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Maatschappijetc. v, Kosloff, 45 F. (2d) 94 (C. C. A. 2d 193o); In re Meyerfdd, 46 F.
(2d) 665 (D.C. N.D. Cal. 1931); Barnes v. Barnes, 282 Ill. 593, 118 N.E. ioo4 (1918).
It is somewhat difficult to reconcile the present case with these principles. There is
some doubt as to whether the defendant was substantially injured by the acts of the
plaintiff. In the first place, the facts involved in the agreement to siippress evidence
were brought to light during the course of the present suit; hence it may be said the
agreement did not prejudice the defendant. Cf. Conn. Tel. Co. v. Brown & Came,
io F. (2d) 823 (D.C. Ill. 1926). Although the agreement to suppress evidence did
not prejudice the defendant, it could still be argued that the use of the decree in the
Byers suit had produced an injury, inasmuch as on motion for a temporary injunction
a prior decree of validity is entitled to considerable weight. Leeds & Catlin v. Victor
Co., 213 U.S. 301, 319, 29 Sup. Ct. 495, 53 L. Ed. 805 (i9o9). The injunction was not
granted in the present case, but defendants were required to post a heavy bond instead; and the Supreme Court considered this sufficiently burdensome.
In the second place, it would seem that if plaintiff had secured only an assignment of
rights from the prior user the result as to suppression of evidence would have been substantially the same as that which developed under the express agreement to suppress;
and the court made no criticism of the assignment. Third, after the evidence came to
light in the present suit, the defendants in the Byers case attempted to have the decree
therein set aside, but it was held that the prior use was an abandoned experiment and
that plaintiff's conduct, though hardly excusable, was immaterial. Keystone Driller
Co. v. Byers Machine Co., 4 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ohio 1932). It is possible that two
courts might interpret the same evidence in different ways; however, this is improbable
in view of the rule that where evidence of an anticipation is oral, as it was here, proof
must be "ciear, satisfactory and beyond a reasonable doubt." Barbed Wire Patent,
143 U.S. 275, 12 Sup. Ct. 443, 36 L. Ed. 154 (1892); Albertson & Co. v. Alvord Reamer
Co., 51 F. (2d) 557 (D.C. Pa. i93i); i Walker, Patents (6th ed. 1929), 141-144, § i16.
Inasmuch as the plaintiff did combine a fraudulent intent with an overt act (attempt to suppress evidence), the application of the maxim may be supported on that
ground. In a sense, too, plaintiff's acts were illegal; the government could sue to cancel
his patent if a prior use had been made, and it appears that at the time plaintiff applied
for a patent he had some knowledge of the prior user's acts. i Walker, Patents (6th
ed. 1929), 474, §§ 383, 384. However, it would seem that in the patent field such
"collateral" illegality is insufficient to invoke the maxim. Western Glass Co. v.
Sclmertz Co., 185 Fed. 788 (C.C.A. 7th 1911); Carson Inv. Co. v. Anaconda Copper
Co., 26 F. (2d) 651 (C.C.A. 9 th 1928), cert. den. 278 U.S. 635, 49 Sup. Ct. 32, 73 L. Ed.
551 (1928); cf. Conn. Tel. Co. v. Automotive Co., 14 F. (2d) 957 (D.C. N.J. 1926),
affd. ig F. (2d) 990 (C.C.A. 3 d 1927), cert. den. 275 U.S. 543, 48 Sup. Ct. 121, 72
L. Ed. 428 (1927); but cf. Creath v. Sims, 5 How. (U.S.) 192, 12 L. Ed. ii (1847).
Even if the nature of plaintiff's acts is such as to permit the application of the
maxim, it must be shown that those acts are sufficiently closely related to the subject
matter of the suit. Although it may be admitted that plaintiff's conduct was closely
related to the patent included in the agreement to suppress evidence, it was far less
closely related to the other four patents, and it seems doubtful whether the maxim
should be invoked as to them. It is true the patents related to the same device, and
thus were closely interwoven; however, the court admits that the infringement of each
patent gives rise to a distinct "cause of action," and thus implies that a separate successful suit could be brought for the infringement of each patent. This the court recog-
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nizes in the form of decree rendered; the suit is dismissed without prejudice to any
future actions on any patent involved in the suit. The opinion of the lower court
distinctly contemplates the commencement of new actions as to all five patents,
or at least as to the four patents not involved in the agreement to suppress evidence;
see General Excavator Co. v. Keystone Driller Co., 62 F. (2d) 48, 51 (C.C.A. 6th
1932). This result, however, gives the "clean hands" maxim a very insubstantial effect; it requires plaintiff to pay the costs of the present suit, and then institute another.
It would seem that, if the maxim is to be applied in a practical manner, it should result
in barring plaintiff's rights as to the entire subject matter of the suit, or in barring
plaintiff's rights as to part of the subject matter involved but permitting him to recover for the balance of the subject matter in the same suit. The maxim should not
result only in a dismissal of the present suit, and the bringing of a new one. But see
opinion of court below, denying rehearing, General Excavator Co. v. Keystone
Driller Co., 64 F. (2d) 39, 40 (C.C.A. 6th 1933) (maxim bars only the present suit and
has no application to the future).
JOSEPH J. ABBELL

Evidence-Hearsay-Dying Declarations-States of Mind-[Federal].-The de-.
fendant, Dr. Shepard, was indicted for the murder of his wife who had died from
poisoning. The prosecution introduced in evidence as a dying declaration the statement of the deceased: "Dr. Shepard poisoned me." Both the Circuit Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court of the United States held that sufficient ground had not been
laid to make the statement admissible as a dying declaration. The Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, sustained its admission on the theory that it was evidence of a
state of mind, rebutting evidence of suicide introduced by the defendant. Held, that
such statement was not admissible for this purpose. Shepard v. United States, 54 Sup.
Ct. 22 (1933).
The evidence fell short of showing that at the time the deceased stated that Dr.
Shepard poisoned her she had a settled hopeless expectation of death, and so the
statement was quite properly excluded as a dying declaration. State v. Weaver, 57
Iowa 730, ix N.W. 675 (1882); Bell v. State, 72 Miss. 507, 17 So. 232 (r895); Smith v.
State, x61 Miss. 430, 137 So. 96 (I931); 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923), §§ x44o,
1442; but see 82 Univ. Pa. L. Rev, 290 (1934).
The most interesting aspect of the case is the light it throws on the attitude of the
Supreme Court as to the use of hearsay evidence in proving states of mind. Justice
Cardozo, in whose opinion all the justices concurred, clearly sought to limit the admissibility of such evidence to show a state of mind as a step in the proof of an act
consistent with that state of mind. He accepted the suggestion of Professor Maguire
that the rule should be limited to cases where the argument is from a state of mind to
subsequent conduct, as contrasted with prior conduct, of the speaker, or perhaps the
joint conduct of the speaker and another. Maguire, The Hillmon Case Thirty-three
Years After, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 709 (1925).
The use of the statement, that Dr. Shepard poisoned her, which the Circuit Court
of Appeals allowed in this case cut far deeper into the hearsay rule than any of the
cases so far decided with the exception of the cases which admit statements of a
present state of mind to prove past acts in will contests. Thompson's Estate, 200 Cal.
410, 253 Pac. 697 (1927); McMurtrey v. Kopke, 250 S.W. 399 (Mo. 1923); Behrens v.
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Behrens, 47 Ohio St. 323, 25 N.E. 209 (1890); 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923),
§ 1736; contra, Throckinorton v. Holt, i8o U.S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct. 474, 45 L. Ed. 663
(1goo). These are now regarded as a separate class. In re Shelton's Will, 143 N.C. 218,
55 S.E. 705 (igo6); Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence
-State of Mind to Prove an Act, 38 Yale L. Jour. 283 (1929); Maguire, The Hillmon
Case Thirty-three Years After, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 709, 715 n. 22 (1925). The statement, "Dr. Shepard poisoned me," on analysis means, "I believe that Dr. Shepard
poisoned me." Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
394 (1934). This is using a hearsay statement to prove a state of mind, which is
permissible according to Mitual Life Insurance Co. v. Hilhnon, 145 U.S. 285, 12 Sup.
Ct. 909, 36 L. Ed. 7o6 (1892), and cases following it. State v. Journey, 115 Conn. 344,
161 At. 515 (1932); State v. White, 52 Nev. 235, 285 Pac. 503 (1930); Commonwealth v.
Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 135 Atl. 301 (1926). The next step in the analysis is that since
the deceased believed that Dr. Shepard poisoned her, it follows circumstantially that
she believed that she did not poison herself. But the following step is that if she belieired that she did not poison herself, then as a matter of fact she did not. This step,
involving the element of memory and possibly perception, dearly conflicts with the
hearsay rule. It is just this step which the courts refuse to take in excluding evidence
of overt acts to show belief as to a state of facts to prove the state of facts believed.
State v. Piernot, 167 Iowa 353, 149 N.W. 446 (1914); Wright v. Doed. Tatham, 7 Ad. &
Ell. 313 (1837); 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) § 267.
The language of the opinion in refusing to accept the evidence was, nevertheless,
unfortunate, for it was said simply that "the testimony now offered faced backward
not forward." If the statement were used to show a present state of mind as the basis
for an argument that that state of mind probably extended into the past, there would
be no objection to it. State v. Hudspeth, 159 Mo. 178, 6o S.W. 136 (19oo); Rawson v.
Haigh, 2 Bing. 99 (1824). Only when the argument is from past belief to the truth of
the facts believed is it to be condemned.
The argument has been made that if declarations are admissible to a show state
of mind in order to prove a future act, then logically they should be admissible to show
a state of mind in order to prove a past act. Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 146 (1912). The present case is an excellent example of the
answer thereto made by Professor Chafee, that when a declaration as to state of mind
is used to prove a past act, it is apt to be in a testimonial form so that it is practically
impossible for the jury to consider it as anything but a direct statement of the fact
to be proved. Chafee, Review of Wigmore: Evidence, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 513, 519
(1924). Thus in this case the statement is sought to be used simply to prove that Mrs.
Shepard did not commit suicide. It would be impossible for the jury to use the statement for this purpose alone and to overlook the fact that it is a direct statement of the
ultimate issue in the case. No such difficulty arises when a declaration of a state of
mind is used to prove a future act, because the only use that the jury can make of the
evidence is purely circumstantial.
BnnmsoN GRow
Federal jurisdiction-Construction of Uniform Laws in the Federal Courts[Federal].-A suit was brought in federal court on a note executed in Florida, bearing
interest on the principal amount and on overdue interest payments. Held, the note was
non-negotiable under the Florida Negotiable Instruments Law, in spite of decisions
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to the contrary by the Supreme Court of Florida. Burns 2fortgage Co. v. Fried, 67 F.
(2d) 352 (C.C.A. 3 d 1933).
The provisions of Judicial Code § 34, as amended [i Stat. 92 (1789), 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 725 (1928)], make it obligatory on the federal courts to regard as "rules of decisions
in trials at common law" the "laws of the several states." In Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet
(U.S.) i, lO L. Ed. 865 (1842), the term "laws of the several states" was construed to
exclude the decisions of state tribunals on questions of "general commercial law";
on such matters the state court decisions are merely evidence of the law, and the
federal courts will decide for themselves what the law is. But cf. Holmes, 3., dissenting
in Black & White Taxi Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-535, 48
Sup. Ct. 404, 72 L. Ed. 68i (1928); Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (2d ed.
1921) 249-259. The federal courts have since shown a marked tendency to extend this
sphere of independent construction; the phrase "general commercial law" has been
replaced successively by "general jurisprudence" in Lake Shore R.R. v. Prentice, 147
U.S. iox, io6, 13 Sup. Ct. 261, 37 L. Ed. 97 (1892), "general rules of the common law"
in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 914,37 L. Ed. 772 (1893),
and "general law" in Black 6- White Taxi Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Co., 276 U.S.
5I8, 530, 48 Sup. Ct. 404, 72 L. Ed. 68y (1928). But see Cole v. PennsylvaniaR.R., 43
F. (2d) 953, 956-57 (C.C.A. 2d i93o).
In dealing with the "positive statutes of the state," however, the general rule is that
the federal courts, as was indicated in Swift v. Tyson, will follow the construction of
the highest tribunal of the state. Elmendorf v. Taylor, io Wheat. (U.S.) 152, 6
L. Ed. 289 (1825); Bacon v. Insurance Co., 131 U.S. 258, 9 Sup. Ct. 787, 33 L. Ed. 128
(1889); cf. Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U.S. 30, 44 Sup. Ct. 432, 68 L. Ed. 885
(1924); American Ry. Express Co. v. Royster Guano Co., 273 U.S. 274, 47 Sup. Ct. 355,
71 L. Ed. 642 (1927). Several qualifications to this general rule have been suggested:
(i) The state court's decision must precede the trial in the federal court; Burgess v.
Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 2 Sup. Ct. 10, 27 L. Ed. 359 (1883); but cf. Bauserman v. Blunt,
147 U.S. 647, 13 Sup. Ct. 466, 37 L. Ed. 316 (1893); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. C.M. &
St.P.R.R., 175 U.S. 9I, 20 Sup. Ct. 33, 44 L. Ed. 84 (1899); C.M.St.P & Pac. R.R. ",.
Risty, 276 U.S. 567, 48 Sup. Ct. 396, 72 L. Ed. 703 (1928); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S.
52, 53 Sup. Ct. 240, 77 L. Ed. 61o (1933). (2) The construction must be one enunciated by a line of decisions by the state court; cf. Kidrn v. Fairmount Coal Co., 215
U.S. 349, 30 Sup. Ct. 140, 54 L. Ed. 228 (I91O). (3) The construction must give conclusive evidence of the state law; cf. Barberv. PittsburghRy., i66 U.S. 83, 17 Sup. Ct.
488, 41 L. Ed. 925 (897). (4) The statute must be positive, and not merely re-enact
the common law; Capital City State Bank v. Swift, 290 Fed. 5o5 (D.C.E.D.Okla. 1923);
Peterson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., ig F. (2d) 74 (D.C.S.D.Ia. 1926), affd. 19 F.
(2d) 88 (C.C.A. 8th 1927). Whether the statute does re-enact the common law is a
question normally to be settled by the federal court; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lane, i~i
Fed. 276 (C.C.E.D.Ga. 1907), affd. Alexander v. Lane, 157 Fed. 1002 (C.C.A. 5th
1907), certiorari denied 208 U.S. 617, 28 Sup. Ct. 569, 52 L. Ed. 647 (i9o8); but cf.
Byrne v. Kantsas City R.R. Co., 6i Fed. 6o5 (C.C.A. 6th 1894); Babbitt v. Read, 236
Fed. 42 (C.C.A. 2d i916). (5) It has been further intimated, as a corollary of Swift v.
Tyson, that any state statute dealing with the "general commercial law," even though
"positive" in nature, should be interpreted independently by the federal courts; see
American Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Shipping Board, 7 F. (2d) 565, 566 (C.C.A. 2d 1925).
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Because the exceptions to the general rule that the federal courts will follow the
state court's interpretation of state statutes are not yet crystallized, it is not surprising
to find the lower federal courts differing as to the mode of handling Uniform Laws.
One view is that inasmuch as the Uniform Laws do make certain substantial changes
in the pre-existing law, the construction adopted by the state tribunal should prevail.
Savings Bank v. NationalBank, 3 F. (2d) 970 (C.C.A. 4 th 1925); cf. NiagaraFireIns.
Co. v. Raleigh HardwareCo., 62 F. (2d) 705 (C.C.A. 4 th 1933). But the fact that Uniform Laws in the main merely codify pre-existing law has led one federal court to
adopt an independent construction of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Jockmus v.
Claussen &_Knight, Inc., 47 F. (2d) 766 (D.C.S.D.Fla. 193o). The present case aligns
itself with that decision.
Since the main purpose of the Uniform Laws is to create uniformity between
jurisdictions, it would seem that the desire for uniformity in the federal courts which
led to the evolution of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, would also lead to the application
of that doctrine to the construction of Uniform Laws. But in view of the insecure
foundation of the rule of Swift v. Tyson, there is much to be said for restricting it
wherever possible. See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 81-88 (1923). Moreover, at least one court has
interpreted "uniformity" in the Uniform Laws to mean uniformity between state and
federal courts in a particular state. Savings Bank of Richmond v. NationalBank, 3 F.
(2d) 970 (C.C.A. 4 th 1925); cf. Fordham, Federal Courts and the Construction of
Uniform State Laws, 7 N.C.L.Rev. 423, 429-430 (1929).

Finally, it may be doubted

whether independent construction of Uniform Laws by the federal courts will actually
lead to uniformity within the federal judicial system, in view of the recent stringent
limitations on appeal as of right to the Supreme Court. Judicial Code §§ 239, 240 as
amended [43 Stat. 938 (1925), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 346, 347 (1928)]. This is indicated by the
conflicting decisions of federal courts as to the proper mode of construing Uniform
Laws, a point first raised almost a decade ago.
KARL~ HYBER

Insurance, Public Liability-Concealment-Extent of Duty of Disclosure-[Federal].
-Defendant's application for public liability insurance on his automobile was made to
a broker on October 16, 193o, and was sent by him to the Netherlands Insurance Company, who forwarded it to plaintiff insurance company. Plaintiff received the application on October 21, and on that same day issued the policy dated, in compliance with
defendant's request, to take effect on October 18. On October 19, defendant negligently collided with another automobile. He notified the broker that afternoon, and the
broker informed the Netherlands Company the next morning. Plaintiff did not receive
the information from the Netherlands Company until one day after the policy was
issued and brought this action to rescind. Held, decree for plaintiff affirmed. Strangio
v. ConsolidatedIndemnity and Insurance Co., 66 F. (2d) 330 (C.C.A. 9th 1933).
Two conflicting rules have been applied in those branches of insurance in which the
issue of concealment has been adjudicated. Either there is (i) an absolute duty to disclose all facts which might reasonably influence the insurer in granting insurance, or (2)
the insured's only obligation is to act bona fide. Vance, Insurance (2d ed. 1930), 34 4ff.
The absolute duty is consistently applied only in marine insurance. Sun Muttal
Insurance Co. v. Ocean Insurance Co., 107 U.S. 485, 27 L. Ed. 337 (1882); Burritt v.
SaratogaCounty Mutual FireInsurance Co., 5 Hill 188 (N.Y. 1843); Clinchfield Fuel Co.
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v. Aetna Insurance Co., 121 S.C. 305, 114 S.E. 543 (X922). In life insurance, the insured's absolute duty is confined to information received after he has applied but before the insurer accepts. Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 72 L. Ed.
895 (1927); Forresterv. Southland Life Insurance Co., 42 S.W. (2d) 127 (Texas ig3i).
Even here, in Armand v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 235 N.Y.S. 726 (1929), the court
only required good faith. The insured need only act in good faith as to facts known at
the time the application is made. Penn.Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics'Savings Bank,
72 Fed. 413, i9 C.C.A. 286 (1896). The rule of good faith is applied to fire insurance
both as to information known before the application was made and that discovered
later. Springfield Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 51 F. (2d) 714
(i3i);

Davis Scofield Co. v. Agricidtural Ins. Co., io9 Conn. 673, 145 At. 38

(1929);

Great American Ins. Co. of New York v. Clayton, 247 Ky. 612, 57 S.W. (2d) 467 (1932).
It is applied in fidelity insurance. Magee et al. v. ManhattanLife Ins. Co., 92 U.S. 93,
23 L. Ed. 699 (1875); StarIns. Co. v. Carey, 126 Kan. 205, 267 Pac. 990 (1928). There
is no duty to disclose information discovered after the contract of insurance has been
consummated, Pendergastv. Globe and Rutgers FireIts. Co., 246 N.Y. 396, 159 N.E.
183 (1927). Where the insured has failed to fulfil the duty of disclosure, the insurer
may rescind, Fales v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128 Cal. App. 201, 17 P. (2d) 174 (1932).
The Civil Code of California states, "A concealment, whether intentional or unintentional, entities the injured party to rescind a contract of insurance," Cal. Civ. Code
(193)

§ 2562.

The reason given for absolute duty in the marine insurance is that here the relevant
facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the insured and the undervriter must
necessarily rely on him for information, Carter v. Boehm, 3 Burrow 19o6 (766). In
life insurance, facts acquired after the application is made are also said to be peculiarly
within the insured's knowledge. But as to facts known before the application is made
it is suggested that the insured is justified in assuming all material information has been
covered by the comprehensive questions asked and hence need only act bona fide,
Stipcicl v. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 72 L. Ed. 895 (1927). In fire insurance, the company may readily determine the character of the risk and should be sufficientiy protected by the obligation to act in good faith. But in fidelity insurance, only
good faith is required, and yet the relevant facts are more apt to be within the insured's
peculiar knowledge, and it is doubtful if the insured can justifiably believe that the insurer has acquired all necessary information. Only one case previous to the present has
come up in which the insured's duty in public liability insurance was involved, Royal
Indemnity Co. v. May and Ball, 222 Ky. 157, 300 S.W. 347 (1927), and there absolute

duty was imposed. Since public liability is more analogous to marine insurance than
to other types with respect to the peculiar knowledge of the insured and lack of justifiable grounds for believing that the insurer has been able to anticipate all relevant information, it is probable that this case and the principal one will be followed and an
absolute duty of disclosure of material facts applied.
But even if there is an absolute duty of disclosure of known facts, there is the further
problem of what acts will satisfy that duty. In marine insurance, if the insured has
made a reasonable effort to communicate the information in due time, he is not barred
from recovery by his failure to get the information to the company before the policy is
issued. M'Lanahan v. Universal Insurance Co., i Pet. (U.S.) 170, 7 L. Ed. 98 (1828); .
Green v. Merchants' Insurance Co., io Pick. 402 (Mass. 183o); Snow v. Mercantile Mu-
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tual Ins. Co., 61 N.Y. i6o (1874); Pendergastv. Globe and Ritgers Ins. Co., 246 N.Y.
396, 159 N.E. 183 (1927). Reasonable effort in due time suffices in life insurance,
Stipcichv. MetropolitanLifeIns. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 72 L. Ed. 895 (1927), and it has been
indicated that if there is an absolute duty in fire insurance that duty is satisfied by the
insured using reasonable means to transmit the information in due time, Springfield
Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 51 F. (2d) 714 (C.C.A. 8th 1931).
Whether a reasonable effort has been made is at law a question of fact for the jury,
M'Lanahan v. Universal Insurance Co., i Pet. (U.S.) r70, 7 L. Ed. 98 (1828); Green v.
Merchants' InsuranceCo., io Pick. 402 (Mass. 1830), but it is said that the use of means

ordinarily employed is required, Proudfoot v. Montefiore, L.R. 2 Q.B. 5:r (1867), but
suffices when used, Snow v. Mercantile MutualInsurance Co., 61 N.Y. 16o (1874). It is
not dear whether the court in the present case meant to require more than a reasonable
effort to get the information to the insurer in due time, or adhered to that rule and
found the defendant's conduct unreasonable in that he sent the information to his
broker and not to the insurer, or limited the rule to apply only when the information is
sent directly to the insurer or his agent. It would seem, however, that the effort of the
broker to transmit the information to the plaintiff through the Netherlands company
should have been considered.
SAMUEL EISENBERG

International Law-Extradition-Necessity of Criminality in the Asylum State[Federal].-The petitioner was held for extradition from Illinois to England upon a
charge of having received money knowing it to have been fraudulently obtained. The
act alleged was not a crime in Illiiois. The article of the extradition treaty (WebsterAshburton Treaty of 1842, 8 Stat. 572, supplemented by the Blaine-Pauncefote Convention of 1889, 26 Stat. i5o8) covering this offense did not specifically require that
it be criminal in both states, although such was the requirement in articles covering
other crimes. Held, that the writ of habeas corpus be denied, the treaty not requiring
that the offense be a crime in both states. Factor v. Laubenheiiner, 54 Sup. Ct. 191, 78
L. Ed. 15I (1933). Butler, Brandeis, and Roberts JJ. dissenting.
The right to demand extradition and the duty to surrender depend on treaty rather
than international law. United States v. Rauscher, i1g U.S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. 234, 30
L. Ed. 425 (1886); 1 Phillimore, International Law ( 3 d ed. 1879), 517; Pomeroy, Inter-

national Law (Woolsey's ed. i886), 236. But the principles of international law often
throw light upon the intent of the treaty framers and determine to a great extent the
construction to be given the extradition treaty. Thus it was held in United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. 234, 30 L. Ed. 425 (1886), though there was no

relevant provision in the pertinent treaty, that a person could not be tried for an
offense other than the one for which he was extradited, in accordance with the principle of international law to that effect. i Moore, Extradition (1891) 218; Lawrence,
The Extradition Treaty, 14 Alb. L. Jour. 85 (1876). It is a principle of international
law that there will be no extradition for political offenses. x Phillimore, International
Law (3 d ed. 1879), 521; i Moore, Extradition (18gi), 303. Hence it has been held that
though the applicable treaty does not prohibit such extradition, it will nevertheless be
denied. In re Ezeta, 62 Fed. 972 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1894).
Of particular significance in the present case is the "accepted principle that the acts
for which extradition is demanded must constitute an offense according to the laws
of both countries." r Moore, International Law (1891), 112-113; Byron and Chalmers,
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Extradition (i9o3), ii. It has been enunciated in extradition cases under the treaty
applicable to the present case. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 Sup. Ct. 781, 47
L. Ed. 948 (I9O2); Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 42 Sup. Ct. 469, 66 L. Ed. 965
(1921); Greene v. United States, i54 Fed. 4oi (C.C.A. 5th 1907); Collier v. Vaccaro, 51
F. (2d) 17 (C.C.A. 4 th 193'). It has been repeated in cases involving the same offence
as that charged in the principal case. Kelley v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 6, 36 Sup. Ct. 487, 6o
L. Ed. 86i (1915); Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 36 Sup. Ct. 634, 60 L. Ed. 1136
(1915). The court here, advancing beyond previous decisions, refused to apply the
above principle on the ground that the treaty did not specifically require criminality in
both countries for the acts here alleged while it did require criminality in both countries
for other offenses. See Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 Sup. Ct. 531, 71 L. Ed.
793 (1926); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 48 Sup. Ct. 480, 72 L. Ed.
845 (1927).
The treaty states that certain persons shall "be reciprocally delivered up." Great
Britain will not extradite unless the offense is a crime in Great Britain. Extradition
Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. C. 52, § 26, schedule i; Ex parte Piot, 15 Cox C.C. 208
(1883); Re Bellencoutre, 17 Cox C.C. 253 (i89r). The present holding seemingly deprives the treaty of its reciprocity, but this should not be a fatal objection to the
court's liberal construction. But see 32 Mich, L. Rev. 417 (1924), where the present
decision was interpreted to mean that since the offense was a crime in "most states"
the requirement of criminality in both countries was satisfied.
JosEPH TOBE ZOLINE

Taxation-Status of Government Lessees under "Instrumentality" Doctrine[Federal].--Defendant, lessee of oil and gas rights on municipal land used for water
supply and other civic purposes, sought exemption as a state instrumentality from a
federal tax on its share of the net income derived from the lease. The city received a
percentage of the proceeds from the sale of oil and gas removed, and defendant agreed
to pay for all development. The lower court allowed the exemption. On appeal, held,
the lessee's net income was taxable; it was remote from governmental function, and
the effect on the state's activities was inconsiderable. Burnet v. Jergins Trust, 288
U.S. 508, 53 Sup. Ct. 439, 77 L. Ed. 925 (I933).
The broad principle that an "instrumentality" of the government cannot be taxed
has been used to hold lessees of government prolrerty immune from taxation on the
income from the lease. The doctrine as thus applied is exemplified in the Gillespie case
where a state tax on the net income derived from a lease of restricted Indian land was
held invalid. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171, 66 L. Ed. 338 (1922).
The court reasoned that a lease of land dedicated to the support of a governmental
agency is an "instrumentality" of the government, that a tax on the lease is invalid
since it "is a tax upon the power to [lease] and could be used to destroy [that] power,"
and that therefore a tax on the income from the lease is likewise invalid. This doctrine
had been previously enunciated in Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gidf R.R. v. Harrison, 235
U.S. 292, 35 Sup. Ct. 27, 59 L. Ed. 234 (1914), where the gross income derived from
coal mining under a lease of restricted Indian lands was held exempt from taxation on
the theory that the lessee was an agercy succeeding to the duties of the government,
notwithstanding the state's contention that it taxed only the coal at the pit's mouth
as personal property of the lessee. Cf. Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522, 36
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Sup. Ct. 453, 6o L. Ed. 779 (i9i6); Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 248 U.S. 549, 39 Sup. Ct.
183, 63 L. Ed. 416 (igIg).
Since the Gillespie case the tendency has been to limit the application of the rule
there announced. In Group No. i Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U.S. 279, 51 Sup. Ct. 432, 75
L. Ed. 1032 (1931), a federal tax was sustained on income received by lessees of public

school land from the sale of oil produced thereon. The Gillespie case was distinguished
on the ground that by state law a lease operated to vest in the lessee the title to the
oil underground, and hence the income being taxed was derived from the sale of private
property. This distinction seems unsatisfactory, however, in view of the fact that title
to the oil in the GillesPiecase vested in the lessee on severance. See opinion of Stone,
3, dissenting, in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 401, 52 Sup. Ct. 443,
76 L. Ed. 815 (193). The latter case, though holding invalid a federal tax on the net
income from oil lands dedicated to the support of public schools and leased from the
state, conceded that the doctrine of the Gillespie case should be limited to "circumstances closely analogous." See Indian Territory Co. v. Board of Equalization, 288 U.S.
325, 53 Sup. Ct. 388, 77 L. Ed. 503 (i933); 33 Col. L. Rev. 1075 (i933). In the present

case the court reads into this dictum of the Coronado case the implication that before
the circumstances are sufficiently analogous to the Gillespie case, the lands involved
must be exclusively dedicated to the support of a definite and strictly governmental
purpose.
The Gillespie case rests on the premise that a lessee of lands from which a government derives income for its governmental functions becomes thereby an instrumentality of that government. Clearly, however, a lessee is not an instrumentality -in the
sense that he is an active participant in a governmental function. See McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (ixi8); South Carolinav. U.S., 199 U.S.
437, 26 Sup. Ct. I1o, 5o L. Ed. 261 (i9o5). A lessee is conducting an essentially private
enterprise. Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762, 24 L. Ed. 313 (1876); Wells v. Savannah, 18i
U.S. 531, 21 Sup. Ct. 697, 45 L. Ed. 986 (igoo); Garland County v. Gaines, 56 Ark. 227,
19 S.W. 602 (1892); LaSalle County Mfg. Co. v. Ottawa, i6 Ill. 418 (3855); Moeller v.
Gormley, 44 Wash. 465, 87 Pac. 507 (1907). Moreover, the income from the sale of an

article which is personal property of the vendor at the time of the sale has always been
a legitimate subject of taxation. Alderman v. Wells, 85 S.C. 507, 67 S.E. 781 (90io);

Ex rel. Chandlerv. French,73 W.Va. 658, 8i S.E. 825 (1915). For purposes of taxation,
income as such has been classified as a separate entity regardless of its source, and
without relation to any particular property or business. Tyle Realty Co. v. Andrews,
240 U.S. 115, 36 Sup. Ct. 281, 6o L. Ed. 554 (i915); Black, Income Tax (2d ed. 191),
§ 187. And even if the lessee were in fact an agency of the government, "no constitutional implications prohibit a state tax upon the property of an agent of the government merely because it is the property of such agent," Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18
Wall. (U.S.) 5, 33, 21 L. Ed. 787 (1873).
In view of the dubious foundation of the Gillespie case, and of the immunity from
state and federal taxation it grants to large private incomes, it would seem more desirable to follow the suggestion of the dissenting justices in Burnet v. CoronadoOil Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 401, 52 Sup. Ct. 443, 76 L. Ed. 815 (i931), and overrule the Gillespie
case, rather than follow the method of the present case of limiting it by tenuous distinction which will lead to further litigation.
WILLIAm L.
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